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Abstract Pike’s phenomenology of mystical experiences articulates sharply where
theological content may enter the structure of Christian mystics’ experiences (as
characterized in their own words). Here we look to Buddhist (and other) accounts of
“pure” or “nibbanic” consciousness attained in experiences of deep meditation. A
contemporary “modal” model of inner awareness is considered whereby a form of
pure consciousness underlies and embraces further content in various forms of
consciousness, including mystical experiences in different traditions and experiences
of “full union” (with God).
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Prolegomena: Pike’s Project
Nelson Pike’s final phase of work produced his richly contoured book, Mystic
Union: An Essay in the Phenomenology of Mysticism (1992). It is fitting that he
published the book with Cornell University Press, for Nelson was already studying
the phenomenology of mystical experience when he taught at Cornell in the 1960s
(as Marilyn McCord Adams told me in conversation).
Mystical experience includes a variety of exceptional forms of consciousness. In
many characterizations, the meditator experiences a kind of “pure” consciousness, as
the objects of everyday consciousness leave the scene and the sense of self also
leaves the scene, resulting in an experience of pure consciousness without any sense
of either subject or object. In ancient Buddhist terms this form of consciousness is
associated with nibbana or nirvana. “Nibbana” is the Pali term used in the original
Buddhist canon, a variation on the older Sanskrit “nirvana”.
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Popular images of “nirvana” are surely far from the experience achieved in deep
meditation. I should like to use the term “nibbanic consciousness” for that basic form
of awareness described in accounts of deep meditative consciousness and ultimately
peak mystical experiences.1
Pike’s concern is a specific form of consciousness wherein the Christian mystic
experiences what she/he describes as a union with God. Pike’s phenomenology of that
form of experience proceeds by a careful study of classical accounts recorded in writing
by a series of mystics in the Christian tradition. How can we map out the structure of
experiences of nibbanic consciousness? How does the experience of union with God
take shape within that structure, given that both subject and object have disappeared in
the mystic’s consciousness? These are the issues we shall address.
The approach I should like to take here to Pike’s sensitive analyses of mystical
experiences is two-fold. First, I should like to tie Pike’s conception of phenome-
nological analysis into the broad practice of phenomenology initiated by Edmund
Husserl. Second, I should like to consider a particular model of consciousness that
offers a structure which, on reflection, allows for nibbanic consciousness. That
model I’ve called the “modal” model of (self-) consciousness. We note immediately
that the particle “self-”here does not allude to the subject “I” (the self that is said to
disappear), but rather to the awareness-of-experience that is held to be intrinsic to
consciousness per se.2
Phenomenology and Phenomenography: Pike’s Methodology
Phenomenology is the study or analysis of consciousness—of particular forms of
conscious experience—as experienced from the first-person perspective, that is,
from within consciousness (allowing for “self-less” forms of consciousness). In the
broad style inaugurated by Husserl, we reflect on a familiar form of experience,
developing a phenomenological description (or analysis) of that type of experience. I
see a tennis ball bouncing toward me. Here I have a familiar form of experience, one
I have often lived through. Reflecting on what it is like to have this experience, I
produce a simple phenomenological description:
I see this yellow bouncing tennis ball coming toward me, and I turn toward it
and start to swing my racquet to meet it.
Of course, a much more interesting and detailed description is appropriate,
addressing sensation, conception, kinesthetic-proprioceptive bodily awareness, and
volitional movement—all in the complex flow of consciousness as I play tennis. For
our purposes, however, this simplified description begins to articulate various
1 I borrow the term “nibbanic consciousness” from Miri Albhari’s insightful study: Analytical Buddhism:
The Two-Tiered Illusion of Self (2006). Albahari’s focus on nibbanic consciousness, in the classical
Theravada Buddhist tradition, evolves through studies of consciousness arising in current analytic
philosophy of mind. Her results are amenable in my eyes to analytic phenomenology. Thus her title is apt.
The term “nibbanic consciousness” indicates, to my ear, a phenomenon that deserves its own special
name. “Pure consciousness” is suggestive, and I shall often use it in apposition, but it may not naturally
indicate this specific phenomenon. Compare the studies in Robert K. C. Forman (editor), The Problem of
Pure Consciousness: Mysticism and Philosophy (1990).
2 Here see a series of studies: Smith (1986, 1989, 2004, 2005).
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features of my conscious visual and enactive experience amid a point in a game
of tennis.3
This broad approach to phenomenology fits Pike’s project, announced in the
subtitle of his book, “An Essay in the Phenomenology of Mysticism”. But now the
practice gets interesting. If Nelson or you or I have never experienced a bona fide
mystical experience, then how can we get going in an analysis of the form of
mystical experience as experienced from the first-person perspective?
Pike’s practice is to study the actual first-person reports of a number of mystics.
His phenomenology of mystical experience thus proceeds by articulating a
phenomenological description drawn from the other’s first-person perspective on
her/his mystical experience. Pike calls this practice phenomenography.
Interestingly, Husserlian phenomenology provides the tools to amplify Pike’s
methodology here. Indeed, following the style indicated above, we observe that
classical phenomenology proceeds by developing phenomenological descriptions of
experience—how else?—in words: in language, communicating to others what the
first-person form of experience is like in a given case, even if others have not
experienced precisely that form of experience. Accordingly, Pike’s conception of
phenomenography aptly fits the style of analytic phenomenology, which pays close
attention to the language of phenomenological description and, if you will, its logic.4
But there is more. One of the richest pieces of phenomenological analysis Husserl
developed was his account of empathy (Einfühlung).5 When I see the anger in your
face, I understand how you feel, instinctively by empathy. When I see that you see
the tennis ball flying toward my backhand, I understand what it is like for you to see
that ball from your spatiotemporal perspective. The first-person perspective begins
with one’s sense of location: “I” am “now here” as I see the tennis ball in flight,
moving my eyes, head, torso, feet as I address its arrival. But not only do I
experience the ball’s flight from my visual perspective. I also experience it as “there
for you”, that is, as it would appear from your visual perspective on the other side of
the net. I experience my seeing the ball; you experience your seeing the ball. And in
empathy I experience your seeing the ball: not actually from your own perspective
(with your own eyes), but from my deferred perspective as if I were in your tennis
shoes (with your eyes moving well above your shoes). I sense empathically how you
seem to be seeing the ball’s flight. That is, in my empathic perception of your seeing
the ball, I grasp intuitively what it is like for you to see it from your perspective.
Now, I should like to propose, the practice of phenomenology itself always
essentially involves empathic apprehension of the form of experience articulated in a
3 Husserl developed a specific methodology for studying consciousness as experienced: the famous
method of epoché or bracketing. I bracket, or put aside, the question of the existence of the object I (seem
to) see, and thereby focus instead on my experience (as if) of that object. Here we may assume a simplified
account of the practice. See Husserl, Ideas I (1913/1983) and Ideas II (1912/1989). See Smith (2007) for a
contemporary reconstruction of Husserl’s conception of phenomenology and its methodology.
4 This style of phenomenology is elaborated in Smith and McIntyre (1982) and in Smith (2007). This way
of doing business in phenomenology is sometimes called analytic phenomenology. Its style is influenced
by the seminal work of Dagfinn Føllesdal, who works in logical theory as well as Husserlian
phenomenology. Husserl’s conception of transcendental phenomenology is developed in Husserl, Ideas I
(1913/1983) and Ideas II (1912/1989).
5 See the rich account of empathy and intersubjectivity in Husserl, Ideas II (1912/1989).
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given phenomenological description! When I produce a description of the form of
experience I am living through, my description allows you to grasp what that form of
experience is like. When Husserl or Merleau-Ponty produces a description of a
perceptual experience (“I see the woolly yellow of the tennis ball at my feet”), the
point is to bring out to anyone what that form of experience is like. If anyone were to
have that form of experience, that is what it would be like for her.
So phenomenology in practice naturally proceeds by phenomenography.
The situation with mystical experience is, to be sure, much more challenging. It is
difficult to describe to a sightless person what it is like to see red as opposed to blue
(red is “warm”, blue is “cool”?). It is still more difficult to describe to the everyday
person, busy with everyday life, what it is like to have a mystical experience. That is
why Nelson Pike’s book is so remarkable, exploring the mystic’s own poetic
descriptions of her experience. The mystic describes her mystical experience in rich
detail. But this phenomenological description is produced in retrospect. That
retrospective perspective is itself in effect an empathic apprehension. If I am the
mystic, I now tell you what it was like for me then to experience “pure”
consciousness. In retrospect, and in phenomenological description, the present “I”
projects itself empathically into the perspective of the past “I”. Yet this empathic
apprehension at a distance—within the same stream of consciousness—finds that the
sense of “I” disappeared in the prior experience. To be exact, then, this present
retrospective experience projects consciousness (ostensibly sans self) from this
present phase into that past phase of consciousness (sans self).
And so the phenomenological description proceeds: characterizing the sense of
that prior state of consciousness now “for anyone” to grasp. Already, we see that the
phenomenological structure “I” is minimally, as Husserl emphasized, a “zero point”
of orientation in occurrent consciousness, not yet an object, a substantial mental or
spiritual substance. But here we get ahead of our story.
Factors of Consciousness: The Modal Model
Consider, more closely, my prosaic experience of seeing a tennis ball advancing
upon me, challenging my backhand stroke.
The phenomenological form of my experience can be factored into several
distinct and distinctive features. What am I conscious of? This ball approaching,
this yellow, bouncing tennis ball. What species of experience presents this ball?
Visual perception. I see the ball. (I also hear its bounce on the court, but that is
another slice of my total consciousness.) When and where does the ball appear
visually? Now, in the present phase of the flow of events including my stream of
conscious activity. Here, in relation to my own moving body. And to whom does
the ball now here visually appear? To me. I now here see this ball. (My opponent
also sees the ball approaching me, but that visual appearance is to him.) In what
context of experience does all this occur? In my current phase of consciousness. In
this very experience I now here see this ball. And is all this appearing—
experientially, phenomenally—in my experience? Yes. Phenomenally in this
experience I now here see this yellow, bouncing ball. That is what it is like to
experience this act of consciousness!
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We have just constructed a basic phenomenological description of my experience:
Phenomenally in this very experience I now here see this yellow, bouncing
tennis ball (as I move about to strike it with my racquet).
This analysis of phenomenological structure articulates what I have called the modal
model of (self-) consciousness.6 In that analysis we factor the structure of the
experience into several different characters. The mode of presentation in the
experience is that of the content <this yellow, bouncing tennis ball …>. A categorially
distinct part of the structure of experience is the modality of presentation, that of the
“modal” content <phenomenally in this very experience I now here see>. Where the
mode of presentation concerns the way the object of consciousness is experienced, the
modality of presentation concerns the way(s) the act of consciousness is executed.7
Within the modality, then, we have factored out several importantly different
characters of the experience:
<phenomenally>, marking the phenomenal character of the experience, or what
it is like as it “appears” in consciousness;
<in this very experience>, articulating the reflexive self-intimating character of
the experience;
<I>, defining the egocentric or subject-oriented character of the experience as
enacted by the subject;
<now>, defining the temporally present character of the experience as unfolding
in the stream of consciousness;
<here>, defining the spatially orienting character of the experience with respect
to the “lived” body of the subject;
<see>, defining the species of experience, including here the sensuous character
of the experience.
Of particular interest is the modal character <phenomenally in this very
experience>. On the modal model, this character defines the form of inner
awareness of the experience.
A central thesis in the theory of consciousness is the principle that a conscious
mental act includes a pre-reflective form of self-awareness, or “inner awareness”.8 In
classical phenomenology, leading from Brentano into Husserl into Sartre, this form
of awareness is constitutive of consciousness. As Sartre put it, self-consciousness
(conscience de soi) is constitutive of consciousness itself (conscience): to be
conscious of some object is eo ipso to be conscious of that consciousness. The core
of this thesis takes shape in a variety of philosophical theories. What the modal
model proposes is a particular form for that “self-awareness” without which mental
6 See Smith (1986, 1989, 2004, 2005).
7 The terms I use here echo logical notions: Frege’s notion of Sinn as carrying a “mode of presentation” or
manner of being given in consciousness, and of course Husserl’s notion of noematic Sinn; Hintikka’s
notion of intentional “modalities” including belief, perception, et al. See Smith and McIntyre (1982) on the
semantic affinities of phenomenological notions. The “modal” characters include what Husserl called
ways-of-givenness (Gegebenheitsweise), such as visuality, attentiveness, temporality (horizonal)—though
Husserl’s treatment of these characters was not particularly well-structured, and of course the Hintikkian
notion of intentional modalities was decades away.
8 Avariety of approaches to this thesis are studied in the essays gathered in Kriegel andWiliford (eds.) (2006).
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activity is not conscious. Again, the “self-”of this “self-awareness” is not the subject
“I”, “my-self”, but simply the experience, “it-self”. Indeed, in one ancient Indian view
the original “self” is said to be consciousness (itself).9 And in European philosophy the
“self” is dissolved into experience in the theories from Hume to Sartre.
Is there a way of understanding this character of inner awareness whereby we
may specify the form of nibbanic consciousness? I should like to propose just such
an interpretation.
Nibbanic (or Pure) Consciousness: Awareness sans Object, sans Subject,
sans Intentional Content
The modal model above factors out of a familiar form of visual consciousness the
form of inner awareness: <phenomenally in this very experience>. Phenomenality is
the character of experience “appearing” in consciousness—as we say, “phenome-
nally”. The metaphor of “luminosity” is ancient and suggestive, as if all experience
begins with appearance in the light of consciousness.10 No light, no consciousness,
period. Reflexivity is the self-intimating character of experience. “In this very
experience”, or simply “herein”, an experience or phase-of-experience appears, in
the light. That is, the experience is in this minimal, reflexive way articulated as “this
experience”. No reflexivity, no experience in the light. The fusion of these characters
defines the inner awareness that renders any experience conscious, that is, a unit or
act of consciousness. So goes the analysis.
Now, in the everyday experience appraised above, the character of inner
awareness qualifies the intentional structure of a simple visual experience: an
experience wherein a subject is directed toward an object via a certain content, in a
visual species of mental activity, localized temporally in the stream of consciousness
and spatially in the embodied subject in that activity. “I now here see this … ball”:
inner awareness renders this form of mental activity conscious. But what happens to
the familiar subject-object structure—or, more fully, the subject-act-content-object
structure—in experiences of deep meditation?.
According to classical phenomenological—phenomenographic—reports through
the ages: In sustained meditation the sense of object disappears, i.e. the intentional
content or object-specifying sense disappears, and the sense of self or subject
disappears.11 That is to say, the usual intentional structure of subject-object—or
subject-act-content-object—dissolves in such a meditative state.12 There is then just
this flowing phase of consciousness. Even the normal species of activity, such as
9 See Gupta (2003), page 100.
10 See MacKenzie (2007) on this ancient Indian theme in relation to current Western models of the sort
here in the background. MacKenzie focuses on the difference between “reflectionist” (higher-order) and
“reflexivist” (self-illuminating) models. See Gupta (2003), page 100–101, on consciousness as “self” and
“self-luminosity” on one view in Indian philosophy.
11 Just two contemporary accounts of this experience, drawn from the Buddhist tradition, are Goldstein
(2003) and Albahari (2006), the former practical and the latter theoretical. See also the varied essays in
Walsh and Vaughn (eds.) (1993), emphasizing a “transpersonal” perspective in contemporary practices of
meditation and psychotherapy.
12 I assume, here and above, the broad model of intentionality developed by Husserl in Brentano’s wake.
This conception of intentionality is detailed in Smith and McIntyre (1982) and again in Smith (2007).
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seeing, disappears, as the practice is to refrain from these forms of activity that carry
attention or “intention” from subject to object. Also disappearing is the sense of
temporal and spatial location in the surrounding world (the external “horizon”
wherein the subject is normally acting) or in the given stream of consciousness
(the internal “horizon” wherein the subject’s personal identity takes shape).13
What remains in consciousness is then, we may say, the form of nibbanic or pure
consciousness. The experience that then appears or transpires is a state or process
of “pure” consciousness: sans object, sans subject, sans intentional content, and
sans worldly context.14
This meditative experience is phenomenal: it is appearing, “phenomenally”, in
consciousness, and what it is like is simply one of being conscious, as if awaiting
what else may or may not appear in consciousness. And this meditative experience is
reflexive: it is appearing “herein”, “in this very (phase of) experience”, self-
articulating as simply “this experience”. The experience is one of pure awareness,
inner awareness—not yet an awareness by “me” of some “object”.
Importantly, this form of meditative experience is not itself reflective. It does not
reside in a form of reflection on itself, a kind of higher-order self-monitoring.15 Such
an experience of observation may join the experience. Indeed, such a form of
observant self-awareness is the goal of the practice called “mindfulness” or
vipassana in one Buddhist tradition and similarly “witness-consciousness” in an
Advaita Vedanta tradition.16 In this practice the meditative experience prepares for
an experience of consciousness per se—pure awareness, as it were—and allows then
for noticing particular thoughts, feelings, or sensations that may come along in the
stream of consciousness.
If the modal model is on track, then the primary form of consciousness, isolated
by the meditative practice, is the basic form of experience: <consciously>, or
<phenomenally herein>, <phenomenally in this very experience>. This is the basic
form of nibbanic consciousness. Settling into this nibbanic state is achieved by
various meditative techniques practiced, often beginning by focusing attention solely
on one’s breathing. The fact that further states of consciousness may join or intrude
on this pure consciousness, as particular thoughts or feelings pass by, shows that the
base consciousness is indeed distinct from the whole conscious experience wherein,
say, consciously I now here see this yellow, bouncing tennis ball. The practice of
13 Here I am adapting Husserl’s notion of the horizon of an act of consciousness, both “internal” and
“external” horizon. See Smith and McIntyre (1982) for a reconstruction of the Husserlian notion of
horizon, and again Smith (2007).
14 This sketch is but a gloss of varying forms of meditative experience, which have been described and
analyzed with much complexity. Goldstein (2003) describes (and prescribes) contemporary practices of
“insight meditation” following Buddhist meditative practice today. Albahari (2006) analyzes the classical
Theravada Buddhist “no-self” account of consciousness. Mohanty (1993) studies theories in Indian
philosophy in relation to 20th century Husserlian phenomenology. Gupta (2003) studies key issues as they
develop from the Upanishads through Buddhist philosophy into Advaita Vedanta and more, with an eye to
phenomenology. Many authors writing in Walsh and Vaughn (eds.) (1993) characterize meditative
experiences in contemporary practices.
15 The studies in Kriegel and Wiliford (eds.) (2006) distinguish varieties of theory about how a mental
state may or may not be monitoring itself, in higher-order or same-order or self-representational or
reflexive forms of monitoring.
16 See Gupta (2003), pp. 108ff., on witness-consciousness; Goldstein (2003), p. 37, on vipassana; Smith
and Novak (2003), pp. 74–87, on details of vipassana (more thereon below).
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meditation allows these familiar subject-object forms of experience to flow along
while basic nibbanic consciousness remains what it is.
In the normal case of everyday experience, inner awareness is experienced only as
a proper part, and a dependent part, of the experience: as in consciously seeing the
ball. Meditative experience, by contrast, leads into an experience of pure or nibbanic
consciousness. Then, extending the meditative practice, witness-consciousness
ensues: wherein there is not only the base (nibbanic) consciousness but also, as
observed, a passing thought or feeling in consciousness. The practice enables us to
experience and separate the several factors of everyday experience, sensing the form
of pure or nibbanic consciousness apart from its usual role in conscious subject-
object experience.
Where does this take us in addressing Pike’s phenomenology of mystical
experience? Pike’s perceptive analysis opens the door to our approach here.
Mystic Union: Nibbanic Consciousness with a Sense of Transcendence
Mystical experiences seem to vary across different traditions and times. At least the
reports of such experiences seem to vary.
Sometimes the experience is described as a sense of “nothingness” or of an
“abyss”. That means, I take it, no object and no subject is appearing in
consciousness: consciousness in this form is not intentional, directed from a subject
toward an object, yet it is a consciousness. Particularly striking are the Buddhist
accounts of this “no-self” form of experience: the “self” is found to be an illusion or,
more precisely, an intentional projection or construction not properly found in pure
consciousness per se.17 Interestingly, fragments of these phenomenological themes
recur in Western philosophy quite apart from meditation and mysticism. Hume
famously said he could find in his experience no “self’” (this thing I call “myself”),
but only a sequence of “perceptions”. Similarly, Sartre famously held that
consciousness has no “I” or “ego” (a “subject” from which consciousness aims
toward its object), whence the “self” is an “object” that appears only in reflection. In
any event, our concern here is the phenomenology of mystical experience.
At the other end of the phenomenographic spectrum, mystical experience is
variously described as producing a sense of the oneness of all being, a sense of
“wholeness”, as it were, “all-ness”. Thus, the mystic characterizes her experience as
achieving a union with Being itself, or the Brahman (= Divinity), or The One, or the
Godhead (= Godhood), or simply God! We might say, neutrally, that mystical
experience brings a sense of transcendence, a sensibility which may or may not open
into a more conceptually framed sense of “God”.
Odd as it sounds, “nothingness” merges with “allness”. For the experience of
“nothingness” is a sense of “no-thing-ness”, and therewith “the one” realm of being,
experienced without the differentiations that define particular “things” including
“self” and “object”.18
17 See the analysis of these themes in Albahari (2006).
18 Relevant and varied characterizations of “transpersonal” meditative experience, ranging from “self-less-
ness” to “nothingness” to “wholeness”, are developed in numerous essays in Walsh and Vaughn (eds.) (1993).
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How does God enter the phenomenology of mystic union—where, it is reported,
the sense of self and the sense of object have disappeared? How can the mystic’s
experience present a union of herself with God if her experience does not include a
consciousness of either subject (herself) or object (God) in the experience of union?
And, moreover, how will her tradition’s theological conceptions affect her
experience of mystic union? The narrative arc of Nelson Pike’s book leads into
just these questions.
Pike’s concern is specifically Christian mysticism. His phenomenography uses
richly expressed quotations from a variety of Christian mystics, featuring Saint
Teresa especially, but using other Christian mystics’ quotations to sometimes
contrast with Teresa’s account. These quotations must be read slowly and
meditatively on their own, affording an empathic phenomenology of the experiences
described (to the best of our ability and perspective).
Pike’s phenomenography analyzes proto-typical Christian mystical experience
as unfolding in characteristic phases, described in the first half of Pike’s book
(Chapters 1–4). The second half of the book (Chapters 5–8) addresses the
problem of how to appraise a theistic form of mystical experience. In the final
chapter, drawing on his prior results, Pike presents his own phenomenology (or
phenomenography) of the experience of “mystic union” (Chapter 8).
On Pike’s sensitive interpretation (pp. 159–160), the mystic describes experiences
in deep contemplative prayer wherein she experiences distinct forms of “union with
God”—distinctive forms of transcendence (if I may import that term):
& Prayer of Quiet—where she feels a sense of closeness to God “in here”;
& Prayer of Full Union—where she experiences “union” with God;
& Rapture—where she experiences a “peak experience” of “union”;
& Union Without Distinction—where in “union” the sense of “self” has vanished.
(See pp. 38–39, 208ff, on this latter form of mystical experience.) As an
approximation, these forms of consciousness seem to define a gradation of
consciousness increasingly moving into communion with God. Another form is
that of love as “spiritual marriage”, where, for Teresa, a sense of God as “lover” and
“mother” is experienced.
On Pike’s construction, these forms of experience unfold in temporal
sequence, where the sense of Quiet leads into the sense of Full Union, which
leads into the sense of Rapture, which leads into the sense of Union Without
Distinction. However, the mystic may experience Quiet without Full Union or
Rapture, or without a sense of Union-without-Distinction. Accordingly, I should
like to propose an analysis of levels of consciousness (in due course below). This
analysis has the advantage of allowing commonalities between different mystical
traditions, while making room (per Pike) for theistic and specifically Christian
forms of mystical experience.
Along the way, Pike expands richly on fine points of interpretation. Let me cite
just a couple of key points, which fit well with the themes raised in our account of
“pure” consciousness.
First, Teresa describes the role of her “soul” in these experiences, as if her soul is
moving about in her “interior castle” as she comes into closer and closer communion
with God. (pp. 5–6.) But her use of the term “soul” sometimes means a region of
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consciousness, “an interior world”, and other times means an entity, a substance
(notes Pike) like that Descartes assumed.
Now, the phenomenology of her experience would describe this “interior” soul-
region, but the soul-substance would be ascribed from a metaphysical perspective
external to the mystical experience. When Teresa subsequently reflects on what she
experienced in prayer, we might infer, then she thinks in terms of soul-substance.
This act of thinking—an act of metaphysical judgment—would “intend” not the
soul-region, but the soul-substance. This metaphysical judgment may be distin-
guished from her experience of mystic union per se. In her theological judgment,
then, she might form the belief that her soul-substance came into a special relationship
with the great-soul-substance God (if that is what Teresa’s actual theology holds). It is
crucial here to distinguish phenomenology from ontology or metaphysics. Teresa’s
phenomenology characterizes her consciousness in the experience of mystic union.
Her metaphysics, by contrast, characterizes her soul-substance and God and the
personal relationship between them—all posited, of course, in acts of judgment
articulating her theology, acts that have their own phenomenology.
Second, amplifying the experience of union, Pike quotes Jan van Ruysbroek’s
observation that the self is “melted and naughted” in the union (pp. 28–33). Bernard
of Clairvaux, Pike finds, is more explicit, writing, “To lose yourself … and to have
no sense of yourself, to be emptied out of yourself and almost annihilated, belongs to
heavenly not to human love.” (p. 33) This loss of self, Pike notes, is part of “an
experience in which the mystic makes no distinction between self and God.” (p. 33)
This sense of union sans self, or “union without distinction”, Pike finds, is described
in Blosius’s report as an experience wherein the “loving soul … sinks down into the
abyss of divine love, … it lives in God … [and] in the infinite solitude and darkness
of the godhead …” (The quotation is on pp. 38–39.)
Here we find the phenomenology of loss-of-self describing consciousness as
encountering “nothingness” or “abyss” but also as being immersed in “the godhead”.
Here, the phenomenology of mystic union seems to lead into a form of theologically
informed consciousness wherein “the godhead”—the nature of God—is brought into
the experience. As Pike dissects the experience of mystic union, then, we may
separate the form of “pure” consciousness (the “abyss”) from the more complex
form of consciousness (mystic union) wherein the mystic draws in a theological
conception of the “union” experienced, but all within the “pure” mystical experience.
Thus, drawing on our account of nibbanic consciousness, it seems the Christian
mystic’s experience of “union with God” can be factored into two levels of
experience. First, there is basic nibbanic consciousness. The Christian mystics
quoted and interpreted by Pike describe a form of consciousness as an experience of
“nothingness”, i.e. an experience sans self and sans object(s)—evidently the same
form of consciousness experienced by mystics in other traditions, notably, as long
described by Buddhist meditators. Second, in the Christian mystic’s experience of
union, there is a further level or factor of consciousness whereby this nibbanic
consciousness is infused with a sense of transcendence and indeed, specifically, of
God or the Godhead. This theistic element of defines the mystic’s consciousness as if
of “God”: more specifically, as of “closeness to God”, or of “union with God”, or of
“union without distinction” (rather than as if of “no-thing-ness”). That is, following
Pike’s analysis above, the theistic element may develop—temporally—in the
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different forms described. Then the complex form of consciousness achieved in
mystical union, we would further specify, is itself structured into a nibbanic element
and a further theistic element.
Now, the theistic element (in whichever form) should be seen as a moment, or
dependent part, of the experience of mystic union.19 In Husserlian idiom, the theistic
“moment” carries the noematic sense or intentional content <God> or <union with
God>. However, the nibbanic and theistic elements are distinct factors, “moments”,
in the whole experience. One form of consciousness is a pure, nibbanic
consciousness, which may occur with no theistic factor. A more complex form of
consciousness combines a theistic factor with a nibbanic factor. In that complex
experience, the whole experience comprises two dependent parts, or moments: the
one factor cannot occur without the other within that form of consciousness.
Accordingly, following Pike’s analysis, an experience of mystic union (as described
by Teresa et al.) is a fusion of pure or nibbanic consciousness with a sense of
transcendence and specifically a sense of “God”. Where Pike’s phenomenology
defines a temporal progression through some three phases of Christian mystical
consciousness, we are here defining two distinct levels of consciousness within one
temporally bounded form of consciousness. This two-level structure informs each of
the gradations of mystic union defined in Pike’s phenomenology: respectively,
experiences of “quiet”, of “full union”, of “rapture” in union, and of “union without
distinction”—the one leading temporally into the next. Nibbanic consciousness is
thus the foundation of each of the forms of mystical consciousness that Pike
characterizes, an internal “moment” within each.20
Where there develops a temporal progression from pure, nibbanic consciousness
into a sense of mystic union (involving God), the later theistic experience will
typically depend on the prior nibbanic experience. Indeed, as Pike suggests, the later
phase of mystical consciousness may depend on prior meditative thoughts, whereby
the mystic’s sense of “union without distinction” depends on a retention of the prior
phase of consciousness bearing an explicit sense of union between self and God. The
sense of “union without distinction” is thus more loaded than the simpler sense of
“no-thing-ness” or “all-ness”. Not only is the current phase of consciousness
structured into current nibbanic and supra-nibbanic parts or “moments”; the current
phase is also temporally structured by a “moment” of retention of the prior phase.
(Compare Pike’s analogy on pp. 162 ff.)21
19 Here I assume the notion of “moment”, or dependent part, used in Husserl’s many works: see Smith (2007)
on the varied uses of this notion. An independent part can exist apart from the whole: a bicycle wheel, for
example, can be removed from the bicycle and so is an independent part of the bicycle. A dependent part
cannot be separated from the whole (except in thought or “abstraction”): the yellow of this tennis ball, for
instance, cannot exist apart from the ball itself (following the Aristotelian doctrine of “accidents”).
20 To be clear: an experience of pure consciousness can occur with no theistic element, in one form of
meditative consciousness, whereas a theological judgment with theistic content can occur without a
meditative consciousness of “no-thing-ness”, but nibbanic and theistic moments are fused in an experience
of mystic union.
21 Zelinski has proposed this phenomenological analysis as a further explication of Pike’s interesting
analogy of being struck by a baseball: when you see it coming, your experience is different. Husserl
elaborated the role of retention—as it were, very short-term memory within the stream of consciousness—
in his famous studies of time-consciousness: Husserl (1893–1917/1991). Zelinski’s analysis is developed
in the present journal issue.
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The Sense of Transcendence: Mindfulness, Sensation, Emotion
Yet there is more to say about the sense of transcendence.
A more fine-grained account of the nibbanic level of consciousness, I should like
to suggest, would further factor the base form itself into two levels. Most basic is
simply a pure nibbanic awareness, featuring the sense of “nothingness” cum
“wholeness”, an awareness as if opening to further elements of consciousness. A
sense of openness to experience is already a sense of “transcendence”, prior to any
theistic sense. Indeed, Husserl defines the “horizon” of an experience as a structure
opening to further experience whose content is “indeterminate” yet defines the
“transcendence” of whatever is indeterminately experienced.22 But, now, a second
“moment” of nibbanic consciousness—as traditionally characterized—is a feature of
awareness that may be described as a kind of sensation, a bodily-emotional
awareness.
Buddhist meditation practice, following the Theravada (“Way of the Elders”)
tradition, features a form of meditation called vipassana, characterized as
“mindfulness”.23 Sitting in an appropriate position, the meditator attends to
sensations of breath, bodily posture, passing thoughts, passing emotions, all with
an increasing sense of equanimity, in a state of openness to experience. An
emotional character comes to pervade the meditator’s awareness, featuring
conditions characterized as “divine” feeling (untethered by “I”), compassion, joy
in others’ good fortune, and equanimity.24 According to this phenomenology of
mindfulness, what we are calling nibbanic consciousness has “moments” of both
awareness and feeling: moments, dependent parts, of this base form of conscious-
ness. Of course, the connotations of “nirvana” allude to this emotional sensation.
Reflecting on this characterization of mindfulness-consciousness may help us
understand Pike’s dissection of the experience of mystic union—assuming some
common forms of consciousness in both Buddhist and Christian contemplative
experiences (while allowing differences in the experiences characterized).
Nibbanic consciousness, we now specify, comes in varieties of “pure”
consciousness, with varieties of emotional sensation flavoring this base conscious-
ness. In an expansive mode of mindfulness, then, nibbanic consciousness is at once
an awareness and an emotional sensation: here lies the sense—indeed, the feeling—
of transcendence. This sense of transcendence, we should be reminded, does not
present an “object” in consciousness: no “thing” is differentiated and “felt” as a
particular being. (Following the modal model, we are addressing a “modality” of
experience, not a “mode of presentation” of some object.)
22 This notion of “horizon” (Horizont) is used throughout Husserl’s writings, not least Ideas I (Husserl
1913/1983). See Smith and McIntyre (1982) for a reconstruction of the notion (Chapters 5ff.).
23 Smith and Novak (2003) offer a richly detailed account of various forms of mindfulness in vipassana
practice, including subtle bodily awareness and attendant emotional awareness (pp. 74–87). Their account,
on which I draw here, characterizes traditional Buddhist practices of mindfulness in a nuanced
phenomenology (in effect, a phenomenography à la Pike). Goldstein (2003) characterizes contemporary
practices of “mindfulness” in the vipassana tradition.
24 See Smith and Novak (2003), p. 86, citing the Buddha’s own characterizations. These mindfulness
practices define an “emotional intelligence curriculum”, the authors remark (p. 85), where emotions are
experienced with clarity.
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Think of emotion as a kind of sensation: not visual or auditory but yet visceral, a
sensation pervading one’s being—emotion is indeed a bodily feeling, as William
James already emphasized.25 Gradations of emotion lead into more intense feelings
characterized as “nirvana” or perhaps “rapture”. In this growing sensational nibbanic
consciousness, a feeling pervades the sense of no-thing-ness. Still, no theistic or
theological ideas are taking shape in this form of consciousness. A theistic moment
may or may not then take shape, carrying the mystical experience into a sense of
“the Godhead”.
In this refined model, a philosophically loaded rendition of structure in theistic
mystic union would say that the concept of God enters into the structured experience
of union. We are accustomed to the role of concepts in everyday perception. For
it is nearly a commonplace, following Kant and Husserl, that (for example) I
cannot see—experience a visual consciousness of—“this yellow tennis ball” unless
I have the concept <tennis ball> and even the concept <yellow>, where these
conceptual structures are supported or “filled” (as Husserl put it) by appropriate
sensations or “sensory data”. The sensory and conceptual factors in my visual
experience are moments, dependent parts, of the whole unified conscious visual
experience. Similarly, it may be held, the mystic’s experience of union with God
involves both a form of “spiritual sensation”—the “sensation” of transcendence—
and a form of conceptualization of “God” as what is experienced in this transcendent
presence. Here we distinguish the “sensation” of transcendence from the conceptually
loaded sense of “God” as such.
Indeed, Pike proposes just such an analysis of the mystic’s experience of mystic
union (see pages 161–166, noting the notion of “spiritual sensations”). I draw on the
nibannic analysis above in the spirit of transposing Pike’s vision into a more specific
phenomenological framework. To elaborate this analysis, we invoke the notion of
“intuition” in the technical sense.
Pike calls upon the Kantian notion of intuition (pp. 195ff), responding to the
“construction theory” of Christian mystical experience (proposed by Steven Katz).
Intuition (Anschauung) is direct awareness, the paradigm being perception. In an act
of perception, say, where I see “this yellow tennis ball”, my visual experience is a
fusion of sensation and conceptualization. On the Kantian model, my sensory
manifold is organized by concepts in a “synthesis” producing my visual presentation
(Vorstellung) as of the ball—though (per Kant) my consciousness does not reach the
thing-in-itself. Husserl follows suit, but offers a detailed theory of intentionality. On
Husserl’s analysis, my visual experience of “this yellow tennis ball” is a whole
comprising unified moments of sensation (hyle) and interpretation (noesis) (Ideas I,
§§ 84ff, 88ff). The intentional or noematic content of my experience intuitionally
presents “this … ball” in my environment: “this” particular object “X”, itself given
“simpliciter” (§131). In that way, my visual intuition grasps the thing (in) itself! That
is the Husserlian picture (departing from prior theories such as the Kantian).
25 Smith and Novak (2003) emphasize (pp. 81–82) how “body” and “mind” are experienced inextricably
according to Buddhist (phenomenological) analysis. Husserl’s phenomenological analysis of self, embodiment,
and empathy also shows in detail how in everyday perception the structures of bodily awareness and
consciousness of environing objects are fused: a recurrent theme in Ideas II (Husserl 1912/1989).
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Reflecting on this phenomenological structure in a simple visual experience, we
may begin to appreciate just how distinctive is the phenomenological structure of the
experience of the Christian mystic. Transposing Pike’s phenomenography, we would
say that the experience of mystic union is a direct awareness—an intuition—of God,
of union with God. The mystic’s base nibbanic consciousness is enriched with the
intuitional form of the sense of transcendence: a “spiritual sensation” informed by a
sense of “union with God”.
Intuition: Toward an Expansive Phenomenology of Mystic Union
In the mystical experiences described in Pike’s phenomenography, the mystic feels a
connection—in intuition—with the transcendent, even with God. Yet her sense of
self has “melted” away and so has her sense of discrete objects (such as a flower or
tree or ball). The mystic describes a sense of “nothingness” and/or of the “oneness”
of being, while yet expressing a sense of union or communion with “God”. How
might we understand the varied descriptions, appealing to “nothingness” on the one
hand or to “oneness” or “allness” on the other, and somehow involving a sense of
“God”? What could be more different, though the several mystics seem to be trying
to describe a common form of experience?.
The experience of mystic union, as appraised by Pike, is a very special form of
consciousness and indeed of intuition. Yet it differs importantly from everyday
perception, on which the phenomenological model of “intuition” is based. There is a
“spiritual sensation”: at the very least a feeling of something impressing itself on the
mystic’s consciousness—not precisely as light or sound impresses itself on
perceptual consciousness (as Hume put it, in the form of “impressions”), but
somehow as if pressed from, well, transcendent reality. And in the Christian mystic’s
experience there is a further character: specifically a sense of “God”. What exactly
might this mean?.
The analogy with sensory perception may yet be of assistance. If I look out upon
a scene where all is not well defined, what do I yet see? I look out on an expanse of
the ocean (say, looking from where Nelson Pike himself lived). There is a bluish
haze amid glistening light; no objects appear to me, impressing themselves upon my
visual consciousness. Then, as if out of “nowhere”, out of this bluish-haze of
“nothingness”, a sailboat appears, faintly yet quite definitely. It was “there” all
along, impressing itself on me but not “appearing” in the light of my base nibbanic
consciousness. But now, all of a sudden, “that misty sailboat” appears: the content
<that misty sailboat> takes shape in my visual consciousness. My “soul-region”, my
“interior” region of nibbanic consciousness, is there all along, and now, of a sudden,
it is in communion with this misty sailboat. A further moment of consciousness adds
structure to this prior level of consciousness: “I see that misty sailboat”—now with a
basic sense of myself as an embodied-subject in visual contact with an object in the
great expanse before me, that is, my consciousness now is informed with a sensory-
conceptual content <I see that misty sailboat>.
If I am immersed in the tradition of Mahayana (“great raft” or “great vehicle”)
Buddhism, my consciousness in seeing the sailboat, at the initial level, is one of a
certain sense of union between this basic visual consciousness and the boat
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appearing in my consciousness.26 Moreover, this consciousness is a form of
intuition: the union is directly experienced as real—and is real so far as the
experience is concerned. No Cartesian evil genius is deceiving me, and no
Husserlian epoché is bracketing the reality of the experienced union. In intuition
the experienced perspective is, as it were, both internal and external: as from the
subjective perspective (“now here in this very experience”) and as from the objective
perspective (“that sailboat actually now there before me and affecting my eyes”). By
analogy: If I am the mystic, my consciousness of mystic union is one of a certain
sense of union between “this” base nibbanic consciousness and the transcendent
being experienced therein—though the traditional Buddhist will not take this being
as a substance with specific attributes such as omniscience, omnipotence,
personhood, and so on, that is, along the lines of Christian theology.
Consider, accordingly, the perspective of Teresa, or one of the other mystics
whose experience Pike addresses. From the first-person perspective in my
perception: in seeing the sailboat, I experience a sense of union between my visual
consciousness and the boat appearing in the bluish expanse—a form of visual
intuition just as described above. Now switch to the perspective of the mystic who,
like Teresa, is immersed in the tradition of Christian theology. From the first-person
perspective where “I” am the mystic: in experiencing mystic union, “I” (= “this soul-
region”) experience a sense of union between “this” basic consciousness (= “this
interior castle”) and “this” transcendent being felt (with “spiritual sensation”) therein
(in “union” with “this consciousness”)—“this Godhead”, or “God”, appearing now
with attributes of “His” (or for Teresa “Her”!) greatness.
Has the mystic directly experienced “this Godhead”, in a form of transcendent
intuition? Or has her consciousness moved into a more complex level of mystical
experience, wherein a certain theological conception shapes the experience of
“union”? Or has the mystic’s experience begun to lead into a reflective mode? Has
she taken a step into phenomenological reflection on the nature of this intuitional
experience? Has she taken a further step into a separate act of judgment about her
experience, where her metaphysical beliefs about God shape her judgment about
what she is actually experiencing in this experience of “union”? What is internal to
her experience of “union”, and what is external to the experience?
Pike considers a similar distinction of levels that may be discerned within the
mystic’s experience of union—in thought experiments the reader should experience
in Pike’s own phenomenographic prose (pp. 162–166). With the form of “nibbanic”
consciousness in mind, I close with a nod to the intriguing issue of how a Buddhist
and a Christian experience of transcendence compare (at some appropriate level!).
As it happens, Daniel Zelinski has worked explicitly on the issue of commonality in
phenomenology between two articulate mystics: the 13th century Japanese Zen
26 Smith and Novak (2003) characterize the “great raft” of Buddhist practice ferrying more people (not
only the few) across life’s sea (p. 65). The point here is that in Buddhist experience meditation itself may
be informed by a view of the very practice itself, the Mahayana view as opposed to the Theravada view
(“the way of the elders”, the few). Similarly, Christian contemplative experience is informed by a
theological view of the experience itself, that is, in the cases Pike analyzes. The “great raft” metaphor may
suggest, in the present context, that meditators in different traditions experience a basic level of nibbanic
consciousness, a level that is open to further, differentiating elements of consciousness—as we are here
discussing.
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Buddhist mystic, Dogen, and the 14th century German Christian mystic, Meister
Eckhart.27 Apropos the theology at stake, Pike notes that Eckhart was “roundly
condemned by the pope” for assuming metaphysical monism in describing mystic
union as an “ineffable experience” wherein “I am God” (p. 180, addressing R. C.
Zaehner’s account of theistic mystical experience). With that note I recommend
turning to Zelinski’s reading of these issues and Pike’s results.
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